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PROPOSALS FOR A POLICY MIX IN 
THE EURO AREA
3.1. ECB monetary policies: real effects, financial risks?
Since 2009, central banks have implemented expansionary policies to support
activity and prevent industrialized economies from falling into deflation. In a
recessionary environment, policy rates reached an effective lower bound (ELB)
which has led central banks to resort to unconventional measures. These poli-
cies have resulted in an expansion of their balance sheets, reflecting liquidities
provided by central banks to the financial system and asset purchases. These
actions have raised many questions about their impact on real activity because
recovery has been weak in the Eurozone, notably compared to the United
States and the United Kingdom (see chapter 1). In the following, we focus on
ECB policies’ impact on investment (section a) and on the impact of credit
conditions on investment (section b). Questions have also been raised
concerning the possible responsibility of monetary policy in generating financial
bubbles (section c). The end of QE finally raises the issue of next engine of
growth for the euro area (section d).
a) Impact of ECB policies on investment
There are several key points about investment in the Eurozone which should be
kept in mind. Investment accounts for around 20% of the euro area GDP. Total
investment in volume has decreased by 13% from a peak observed in 2008Q1
until 2015Q4. The investment rate, measuring the ratio of total investment
over value added, was at 26% in 2008Q1 and then fell to 21.7% in 2013Q1
(Figure 43). It has since stabilized around that value despite the ongoing
recovery of economic activity. The difference with the situation in the United
States is striking. The fall started earlier and was more abrupt in the US but it
recovered faster and significantly – from 18.3% at the end of 2010 to 21.5 at
the end of 2015.
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Beyond this global picture, the composition of investment is also informative.
Two features are worth mentioning:
1. Since 2008Q1, the decrease of investment concerned all components of
investment except intellectual property products1 (Figure 44). The bulk of
the decrease stems from the construction sector (residential and other
construction) since its contribution amounts to 12.4 points—with nearly half
from residential investment—from a 13pp decline. The contribution of the
investment in machinery and equipment was lower (-3.3 points) while it was
positive for intellectual property products (+2.8).
2. Investment was badly hurt by the crisis almost everywhere in the euro
area but the divergence in the investment path between countries in the
core and in the periphery is striking (Figure 45). The negative cumulative
contribution of the decrease of investment in Italy, Spain, Portugal and
Greece is close to 11 points (-4.8 for Italy, -4.0 for Spain and -2.2 for
Portugal and Greece). Investment in Germany contributed positively (+1.1)
while the contribution was negative for France (-1.7). For most Eurozone
Figure 43. Total investment rate in the Eurozone and in the United States
   % of value added
Note: total investment includes public, households and business investments. 
Sources: Eurostat, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
1. Size matters, and it must be reminded that the flow of investment in property rights is very
small in comparison with investment in the construction sector. The same comment holds from
the geographical breakdown.
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countries, investment in volume terms is still below its pre-crisis level. The
only exception is Germany, while it is close to its pre-crisis level in other
Northern euro area countries (Belgium, Finland, Austria and Luxemburg).  
Figure 44. Investment in the Eurozone – Asset breakdown
  2007 = 100
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 45. Investment in the Eurozone – Geographical breakdown
  2007 = 100
Source: Eurostat. 
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Assessing the effectiveness of monetary policy to spur growth cannot be
inferred merely by considering the correlation between investment (or another
GDP component) and monetary policy stance. The stance of monetary policy
has been very expansionary in the euro area since the end of 2008 when the
ECB first cut its policy rate to the ELB, and then resorted to a large set of excep-
tional measures to address the liquidity problems in the banking system, the
sovereign debt crisis, the slump in economic activity and the risk of deflation. At
the same time, we have just documented the investment gap. From this nega-
tive correlation, it might be tempting to conclude that monetary policy failed to
provide support to investment despite the sharp stimulus effort.
Yet such a conclusion would confuse correlation and causality. Things might
have turned worse without the ECB’s action. To assess more robustly the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy, we need to resort to a counterfactual analysis.2 The
question is: What would have been the investment trajectory had the ECB not
decreased the policy rate and not implemented unconventional monetary
policy? To do so, we first estimate an equation linking investment to its
standard determinants as identified in the literature. It is generally supposed
that in the long run, the investment rate (gross investment divided by the gross
value added) depends on the margin rate and the cost of capital. Firms tend to
increase investment when their profitability increases and when the cost of
raising funds – either through the banking system or from financial markets –
decreases. Considering the investment rate as the endogenous variable implies
that total investment is also related to demand. The short run dynamics of
investment may also be influenced by total demand, the change in the cost of
funding and the rate of capacity utilization. The role of demand is fundamental
as firms invest because of the return on investment but subject to an expecta-
tion that increasing their capacity will match future demand.
Based on the estimated determinants of the investment rate and their coeffi-
cient (see appendix 1 for details), we can simulate the path of the investment
rate in two alternative scenarios from 2008 onwards and compare them with
what actually occurred. The gap between realized and simulated paths of
investment gives insights on the effectiveness of ECB monetary policies. 
In the first scenario (the status-quo), we assume that the interest rate is fixed at
its 2008Q3 value, i.e. at 4.2%, before the cut started in September 2008. This
scenario builds on the (strong) assumption that the ECB implemented no policy
2. For a recent use of counterfactual analysis to assess the impact of monetary policy on GDP
growth, see Pesaran and Smith (2016).
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at all after the global financial crisis. The gap between the simulated status-quo
and the actual path of investment highlights the impact of standard –the reduc-
tion in the interest rate– and non-standard monetary policy measures on
investment. This scenario does not distinguish between conventional and
unconventional policies. The second scenario deals with the impact of uncon-
ventional measures only. From 2011Q3 on, we simulate the investment rate
under the assumption that the shadow rate (including conventional and uncon-
ventional policy measures in a single measure of monetary policy) has remained
equal to the EONIA rate (which proxies for the conventional stance)3. Thus we
simulate the investment path as if there had not been any unconventional
policy measures, but only conventional ones. 
The different policy rates are illustrated on figure 4. It shows the substantial
policy gap between actual policy (depicted by the shadow rate computed by
Wu and Xia) and scenario 1, hence highlighting the very expansionary policies
which have been implemented by the ECB. The gap between actual policy and
standard (or conventional) measures of scenario 2 is less impressive, for uncon-
ventional measures by the ECB have been strong only recently. 
3. EONIA (Euro overnight index average) is a one-day interbank rate.
Figure 46. Monetary policy stance under alternative scenarios
  Annual interest rate
Sources: ECB, Wu and Xia (2016). 
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Counterfactual exercises are reported in Figure 47. They suggest that monetary
policy has effectively sustained the investment rate. The main support comes
from the decrease in the interest rate implemented during the crisis, hence from
standard measures of monetary policy. Without them, the investment rate
would have been significantly lower than its current level, indicating that the
crisis would have been much more severe. On average between 2008Q1 and
2015Q4, the investment rate would have been 2.3 points below its actual level.
In 2015Q4, it would have been 5.5 point lower than its actual level. The role of
other unconventional monetary policy decisions may be gauged through the
simulation of scenario 2. It suggests that the investment rate has been
supported by non-standard measures but that the effect has been much less
significant. In 2015Q4, the investment rate would have been just 0.3 point
lower than its actual level.
This result is not surprising for at least two reasons. First, the aim of the uncon-
ventional measures was not only to support investment. Second, there is a delay
between monetary policy stimulus and aggregate effect which are estimated
around 18 months and 2 years. As non-standard measures have been imple-
mented later than standard ones, their cumulative effect may not have been
reached yet. Besides, it can be considered that the role of unconventional
monetary policy is not fully captured in scenario 2. The non-standard measures
Figure 47. Investment rate under alternative scenarios
 % of added value
Sources: Eurostat, authors’ simulations.
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have also contributed to the very low level of the EONIA so that taking into
account the difference between the EONIA and the shadow rate is not a
perfectly strict measure of unconventional measures. 
b) Investment and credit conditions
Though effective, as the simulations seem to show, the role of monetary policy
may have been mitigated by other negative determinants. ECB’s decisions only
impact on some variables in the financial and banking markets but the ECB has
not a perfect control on the global financing conditions of firms. Investment is
not only influenced by interest rate but also by demand factors, including the
role of uncertainty, and by banks’ behaviour, hence by credit supply. 
Drawing on the Bank Lending Surveys (BLS) provided by the ECB, Figure 48
illustrates the tightening in credit supply (labelled “credit standard” in the
survey), especially during the subprime crisis in 2008 and 2009 and during the
sovereign debt crisis in 2012. Nevertheless, this tightening in credit conditions
is not the only explanation behind the low credit volumes supplied to the
private sector. Another explanation is that the financial crisis was a negative
demand shock and that firms, especially SMEs, have lowered their credit
demand. Moreover, this negative demand shock has been amplified by pro-
cyclical fiscal policy. This low credit demand is also illustrated in Figure 48
Figure 48. Demand and supply factors in the credit market in the euro area
Source: ECB (Bank Lending Survey).
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between 2008 and 2010 and again between 2012 and 2014. Since then, credit
demand has improved though it remains volatile. A simple correlation analysis
between the growth rate of the investment rate and the credit conditions
suggests that both the supply and demand sides of the credit market matter.
The correlation between investment and credit demand is 0.55, while it is -0.58
between investment and credit supply. 
c) Monetary policy and financial bubbles
Since 2009, the ECB has implemented expansionary monetary policies to
support economic activity and prevent the Eurozone from deflation. The effi-
ciency of unconventional monetary policy measures have been extensively
discussed in the literature since 20094 with most empirical studies focusing on
the impact on asset prices. These studies suggest that expansionary monetary
policy reduces market yields and increases asset prices. 
More recently, the focus has turned to the potential adverse effects of expan-
sionary monetary policies. Some financial commentators swiftly made out asset
price bubbles when stock prices resumed their rise. This debate echoes the
critics raised by Taylor (2009) who suggested that the sustained period of low
interest rate in the United States between 2001 and 2004 fueled the boom in
the housing market and caused thereafter the subprime crisis. However, not all
increases in asset prices are bubbles. It is then needed to identify which part of
the change in asset prices may entail a risk for financial stability and which is
related to the normal response of asset prices to monetary policy. Disentangling
the wheat from the chaff is a tricky issue as the fundamental and bubble
components of asset prices are not observed and can only be identified in refer-
ence to a given theoretical and empirical model. 
On the one hand, rational expectations models provide a first theoretical frame-
work where the fundamental value is determined by the discounted sum of
future cash-flows and where rational bubbles (movements in asset prices which
are not related to the fundamental component) may also arise. Bubbles may
also be represented in models where not all agents behave rationally.5 An
empirical literature has also relied on statistical definitions of bubbles where the
latter are considered as excessive—positive or negative—changes in asset
4. See Borio and Zabai (2016) for a recent survey.
5. See Scherbina (2013) for a survey on how bubbles arise in rational expectations models or
behavioral models.
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Figure 49. Bubble series and the estimated PCA bubble indicator for each asset class
Note: bold blue line plots the bubble indicator for each financial market; the circle red line plots the dis-
counted cash-flow model; the shaded areas plot the statistical approach à la Bordo and Jeanne; and the thin
black lines plot the 9 other series of financial bubbles . The left-hand scale corresponds to the statistical
approach (shaded area): the dummy variable is equal to 1 for booms, -1 for busts, and zero in “normal”
times. The right-hand scale corresponds to other series of bubbles. They are centered and reduced and the
unit is one standard deviation.
Source: Blot, Hubert and Labondance (2016).
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prices, or described boom or bust periods, identified either through a statistical
filter or from methods determining turning points (peaks and troughs).6 
As neither theoretical, nor empirical literature has reached a consensus on this
issue, Blot, Hubert and Labondance (2016) propose an agnostic approach
consisting in averaging the most commonly used models (see appendix 2 for
details). 
Financial bubble series are reported in Figure 49. They show that the recent
increase in stock prices is not characterized by a financial bubble. As for the
housing market, the size of the bubble component remains low in contrast with
the period before the global financial crisis. Finally, the bubble component on
the bonds market has declined since the onset of QE.
We assess the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the three bubble
indicators using Jorda (2005)’s Local Projection method. Monetary policy
shocks are measured following Romer and Romer (2004) and using the amount
of assets purchased by the ECB for monetary policy purposes (the item 7.1 in
ECB’s weekly financial statements). Figure 50 plots the effect of unconventional
monetary policies on the bubble components of stock, bond and housing
markets over 24 months. It shows that, in contrast to the conventional view
that loose monetary policy creates asset price bubbles, non-standard policies
have a negative impact on the bubble components of stock and housing
markets in the euro area. In line with the conventional view, we find that expan-
sionary monetary policy has a positive effect on the bubble component of the
bond market.
6. See Bordo and Wheelock (2007) or Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2015).
Figure 50. Bubble responses to an expansionary shock to unconventional monetary 
policies
Source: Blot, Hubert and Labondance (2016).
−30
0
30
0 6 12 18 24
PCA Bubble Stock
Expansionary Shocks
−30
0
30
0 6 12 18 24
PCA Bubble Bonds
Expansionary Shocks
−30
0
30
0 6 12 18 24
PCA Bubble Housing 
Expansionary Shocks
Proposals for a policy mix in the euro area 101
Consequently, our results suggest, first, that it is not clear that the most recent
period is characterized by bubbles, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, and
second that there is no strong and stable causal link between monetary policy
and asset price bubbles, except on the bond market. The evidence presented
here suggests QE is neither fueling asset price bubbles nor is it a relevant instru-
ment for central banks to control them.
d) The Future of QE
The ECB’s QE is close to its end. Until March 2017, two issues will arise. The first
one relates to the availability of public assets for ECB’s purchases. The second
relates to the next driving force for the euro area.
As regards availability of public assets, it must be recalled that, despite its large
size, ECB’s QE has not exhausted euro area stocks of public debts, far from it. As
illustrated in Table 9, ECB holdings of debt securities would represent 11.1% of
total gross public debt of the euro area by the end of March 20177. The ECB
would hold, for example, 9% of Italian debt, 11% of French debt, 13% of
German and Spanish debt, 15% of Finnish debt and 28% of Slovakian debt.
The proportion of debt held by the ECB, though on an upward trend, is rela-
tively limited in comparison with public debt holdings by other central banks in
the world like the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan.
Indeed, the ECB would hold a smaller share of total debt in 2017 than the US
Fed at the end of 2015, with its holdings of 13.5% of US public debt. The
£375bn held by the Bank of England through its QE programmes8 represented
22.5% of total debt issued by the British government. By the end of 2015, the
Bank of Japan was holding more than a quarter of Japanese total public debt.
Now comparing QE purchases with euro area’s financing needs9 in 2015 shows
that the ECB has not exhausted its purchasing limit of 33%. Indeed the total
purchases of government public debt securities (excluding supranational
purchases) by the ECB were €434.8bn in 2015 whereas estimates of financing
needs amounted to €1,400bn. Even if securities are not purchased on the
7. Under a stable breakdown of purchases computed as the monthly average of purchases in
2015, we compute the expected amount and allocation of debt securities that could be held by
the ECB in March 2017.
8. The QE in the UK started in March 2009 after the BoE announced £200bn purchases of Gilts.
The programme came to a halt in October 2011 and resumed (it was then called QEII) to reach
£375bn in November 2012.
9. Financing needs are calculated as the sum of new debt resulting from budget deficits and debt
arriving at maturity.
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Table 9. Gross public debt and ECB holdings of sovereign
Gross public 
debt (2015) 
Billion, 
national 
currency
Central bank 
holdings 
(31.12.2015)
Billions natio-
nal 
currency*
Central 
banks hol-
dings 
(31.12.2015) 
as % of 
gross public 
debt*
Central 
banks hol-
dings 
(PSPP+SMP) 
(31.12.2015) 
as % of 
gross public 
debt
Planned ECB 
holdings 
(31.03.2017)
Billion 
euro *
Planned ECB 
holdings 
(31.12.2017) 
as % of 
gross public 
debt*
BEL 437.7 15.9 (3.7) 3.6 3.6 39.7 9.1
DEU 2 156.8 115.6 (26.6) 5.4 5.4 289.1 13.4
EST 2.1 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IRL 203.7 7.6 (1.7) 3.7 7.6 19.0 9.3
GRC 337.3 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0
ESP 1 087.3 56.8 (13.1) 5.2 7.5 142.0 13.1
FRA 2 098.9 91.8 (21.1) 4.4 4.4 229.4 10.9
ITA 2 174.4 79.2 (18.2) 3.6 6.5 198.0 9.1
CYP 18.5 0.3 (0.1) 1.5 1.5 0.7 3.8
LVA 9.4 0.7 0.2) 7.3 7.3 1.7 18.2
LTU 15.8 1.1 (0.3) 7.0 7.0 2.8 17.5
LUX 11.2 1.1 (0.3) 9.9 9.9 2.8 24.8
MLT 5.6 0.3 (0.1) 5.1 5.1 0.7 12.6
NLD 4 67.9 25.6 (5.9) 5.5 5.5 64.0 13.7
AUT 2 91.2 12.6 (2.9) 4.3 4.3 31.6 10.9
PRT 2 29.0 11.2 (2.6) 4.9 10.2 28.1 12.3
SVN 32.4 2.2 (0.5) 6.9 6.9 5.6 17.2
SVK 41.2 4.6 (1.1) 11.2 11.2 11.6 28.0
FIN 1 30.3 8.1 (1.9) 6.2 6.2 20.2 15.5
EA 9 758.4 434.8 (100.0) 4.5 5.7 1 086.9 11.1
Suprana-
tionals
60.1 150.26
GBR 1 664.8 375.0 22.5
USA 1 8189.0 2462.0 13.5
JPN 1 197146 3 25001.9 27.1
* PSPP only for the ECB. % of total sovereign purchases in brackets.
Sources: ECB, European Commission, OFCE.
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primary market but on the secondary market, comparing assets purchases with
yearly issuance of securities provides information on the liquidity impact of ECB
decisions and thus on its ability to influence sovereign assets’ prices. In the case
of Slovakia (see Table 10), the ECB purchases amounted to 5.2 €bn in 2015
approaching 90% of Slovakian financing needs. If the ECB had realized its oper-
ations on the primary market, it would have acquired nearly all assets issued
during the year. 10% would have been left to other investors forcing them to
switch to other assets. With 115.6 €bn purchases of German bonds, the ECB has
absorbed the equivalent of 66% of the country’s financing needs. Supposing
that ECB monthly purchases for 2016 are of the same amount as in 2015, the
ECB would buy 79% of the German financing needs. To compare with the
implementation of the QE I and QE II of the Bank of England, purchases realized
in 2009 (resp. in 2012) have represented 97.2% (resp. 76%) of Gilt issuances.
Table 10. Public financing needs and ECB yearly purchases of public debt securities
Total financing needs 
in (€ bn)
ECB PSPP purchases 
(€ bn)
ECB PSPP purchases 
(in % of financing needs)
2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
BEL 80.8 76.3 15.9 19.1 19.7 25.0
DEU 175.2 175.2 115.6 138.8 66.0 79.2
EST Na Na 0.0 0.0 Na Na
IRL 20.8 16.7 7.6 9.1 36.4 54.4
GRC Na Na 0.0 0.0 Na Na
ESP 231.9 236.2 56.8 68.2 24.5 28.9
FRA 376.3 395.9 91.8 110.1 24.4 27.8
ITA 349.9 323.7 79.2 95.1 22.6 29.4
CYP Na Na 0.3 0.3 Na Na
LVA Na Na 0.7 0.8 Na Na
LTU 3.1 2.8 1.1 1.3 35.8 48.1
LUX Na Na 1.1 1.3 Na Na
MLT 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.3 52.9 50.0
NLD 73.7 56.6 25.6 30.7 34.8 54.3
AUT 25.2 24.9 12.6 15.2 50.1 61.0
PRT 35.9 31.3 11.2 13.5 31.3 43.1
SVN 3.5 5.5 2.2 2.7 63.0 49.0
SVK 5.2 6.8 4.6 5.5 89.6 81.6
FIN 16.9 17.5 8.1 9.7 47.9 55.4
Note: financing needs are calculated as the sum of new debt resulting from budget deficit and debt arriving at 
maturity. 
Sources: ECB, IMF (Fiscal monitor, April 2015)
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Another issue relates to the future economic outlook of the euro area. If growth
continues to be weak (see chapter 1), the end of QE will come as a further drag
on the euro area. However, another extension of QE, beyond March 2017,
would be similarly cumbersome: it would highlight the weakness of economic
growth in the euro area and it would be potentially inconsistent with the
continuation of fiscal consolidation as the lack of safe assets would make it less
easy for the ECB to implement its unconventional monetary policy.
To escape this trap – end or extension of QE – requires a better coordination
between monetary policy and national fiscal policies. Two situations are possible.
First, QE stopss but against the backdrop of weak economic growth, coordinated
national fiscal policies must lead the policy mix and weigh on real objectives, like
fighting unemployment, incentivizing innovations through adequate tax poli-
cies, and promote social and public investment with higher and well-targeted
spending, rather than accounting objectives (like the fulfilment of fiscal rules)10.
Second, QE may well be extended but national fiscal policies would also have to
be active and deviate from current fiscal rules. In this second scenario, fiscal
impulses could be lower than in the first; however, they would have to be posi-
tive in order to provide needed government assets for purchase. 
In the current social and economic environment, the European fiscal governance
is once again at stake. The application of fiscal rules has limited rooms for
maneuver and it has forced the ECB to implement non-standard measures, then
to extend them. Though these policies have certainly been somewhat effective at
supporting investment, they ultimately require in return a change in the European
fiscal stance. Unless new fiscal rules are adopted, a new expansionary coordinated
impulse like under the Juncker Investment Plan will have to be provided. 
3.2. Better coordination between monetary and fiscal 
policies: an agenda for governance reforms beyond 
the Juncker plan
The euro area faces slow growth in the short (chapter 1) and the long run (i.e.
risk of secular stagnation, as discussed in iAGS 2016). Monetary policy, though
partially effective in stimulating the real economy, is unable to generate the
required growth alone at both horizons, but it can help governments to fund
10.  In a recent ECB contribution, Vermeulen (2016) advocates the implementation of policies
supporting private consumption.
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the required stimulus. The Juncker Plan may be beneficial (though we lack a
counterfactual) and it is going in the right direction, both in the short and the
long run. The promotion of investment, public and private, is a reply to the
depreciation of capital after years of low investment and the global financial
crisis. However the Plan draws on limited amounts of fresh-money funds. The
extension (decided in June 2016) in time—until 2020 rather than 2017—and in
the amounts of public and private investment—from 315 to 500 €bn—has
been accompanied by an increase from 21 to 33 €bn of new financing.11 In
proportion to EU GDP, this represents an extra impulse of 0.08%. Under the
assumption of a fiscal multiplier of 2 (the fiscal multiplier is usually considered
the highest for public investment; the multiplier is higher the lower the interest
rate and the more cooperative the stimulus), the extension of the Juncker Plan
would produce a cumulative effect of less than 0.2% on EU GDP. Under the
same assumptions, the complete Juncker Plan would have a cumulative impact
of 0.45% on EU GDP after 6 years. 
These effects are not strong and ever more so when one considers the output
gap of EU countries. Jarocinski and Lenza (2016) argue that the output gap of
the euro area in 2014 and 2015 has been considerably larger (in absolute
terms) than official estimates, reaching -6%. iAGS estimates for the euro area
are respectively -4 and -3% in 2014 and 2015. Against this backdrop, not only
are demand policies required but the Juncker Plan is largely under-sized, unless
other demand policies are implemented. But is there some leeway for fiscal
expansion under the current fiscal rules? Alternatively, what other fiscal rules at
the domestic level could help sustain growth in the short and the long run,
while achieving fiscal sustainability and coordination? 
a) Are current fiscal rules sufficient to foster growth?
In June 2015, then November 2015, the European Commission issued a
communication on “commonly agreed position on flexibility in the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP)”. The Council endorsed this position in February 2016. The
position is mostly dedicated to the preventive arm of the SGP, hence on the
attainment (and flexibility in the attainment) of the Medium-Term Objective
(MTO) of a sound budgetary position. 
11. This amount relates to EIB recapitalization and guarantees the EIB provides. With a leverage
of 3, the EIB plans to raise 100 €bn of capital to trigger 500 €bn of investment.
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Flexibility is threefold. First, fiscal adjustment requirements to match the MTO
are differentiated in two ways and symmetrical. Annual fiscal adjustment is lower
for countries whose public debt is below 60% of GDP than above it; it is also
lower for countries which experience bad times rather than good times12. To
get an idea of the implied margins for maneuver, a country with debt above
60% of GDP and an output gap between -3 and -1.5% will “gain” 0.25% of
GDP in fiscal leeway, expressed in structural terms, if it experiences below-
potential growth rather than above-potential growth. It will “gain” an additional
0.25% of GDP if it experiences negative real growth or output gap below -4%. 
Second, the adjustment path towards the MTO will take into account structural
reforms. Structural reforms which are “major”, which have “direct long-term
positive budgetary effects” and which are “fully implemented” may justify a
temporary deviation from the MTO13. This adds to the exceptional circum-
stances under the corrective arm of the SGP. The maximum temporary deviation
from the structural adjustment path is 0.5% of GDP. The deviation must start
being partially adjusted one year after the deviation has been allowed. 
Third, some public investments can justify a temporary deviation from the
MTO. Conditions for eligibility are rather strict. Public investments must be
“aiming at, ancillary to, and economically equivalent to the implementation of
major structural reforms”. For the latter quality to hold, it must be shown that
the investment has “a major net positive impact on potential growth and on
the sustainability of public finances”. If one were to take this recently intro-
duced condition “à la lettre”, the fiscal austerity advocated in the EU between
2010 and 2015 would have to be considered “excessive” under the rules: fiscal
austerity has undoubtedly been counterproductive in terms of growth pros-
pects and debt sustainability. The recent introduction of a criterion for the
eligibility of public investment is helpful as far as it goes but it is not a radical
change in EU fiscal governance. The SGP has not been changed fundamentally
and existing fiscal rules remain in place. 
Moreover, eligible national public investments are “to a large extent” limited to
those co-funded under the EU budget for smart and inclusive growth (46%
percent of an overall EU budget of approximately 150 €bn per year, or 0.5% of
EU GDP) and those co-financed by the Juncker Plan. It gives incentives to partic-
12. The Commission differentiates 5 economic situations, from the worst to the best: exceptionally
bad times, very bad times, bad times, normal times, and good times.
13. The Commission and the Council judge whether a structural reform is “major” but only the
Commission provides an explanation of its judgment.   
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ipate in common EU policies but since their associated amounts are relatively
small, it also severely limits the fiscal leeway it introduces in the application of
the preventive arm of the SGP. 
The introduction of more flexibility in the SGP is not a departure from the SGP
and it does not solve two European problems. The first one relates to the institu-
tional architecture. EU economic governance remains largely the same and is
still suboptimal. The divergence across EU member states (see chapter 2)
requires either fiscal transfers between EU members (in the vein of the optimal
currency area literature) or active unfettered fiscal policies. EU governance is far
from that: the active unfettered policy tool is in the hands of the sole suprana-
tional economic institution in the EU, namely the ECB, which is federal and
mandated to reach average objectives (inflation, then output). In contrast,
domestic fiscal policies are mostly uniformly fettered and passive, except at the
margin under quite bad economic conditions. The application of the subsidi-
arity principle should dictate the use of domestic fiscal policies aiming at
domestic objectives and whose externalities should not jeopardize euro area
public finance sustainability or euro area external balance. It would require some
assessment at the level of the euro area as a follow up to the strengthening of
the EMU promoted by the Five Presidents and endorsed by the Commission. 
The second European issue is the dramatic neglect of public investment which
may require a stronger push than that pertaining to the needed flexibility of the
SGP for stabilization purposes. In fact, public investment has suffered dispropor-
tionately strongly under the austerity policies pursued. This is exactly what
could have been predicted in the absence of special provisions protecting and
supporting public investment: cutting public investment spending is usually
seen to be the politically easiest way of reducing budget deficits. Independently
of the current crisis, there is evidence that fiscal contractions were a key factor
responsible for the decline in public investment in earlier decades (Välilä et al.
2005; Turrini 2004: 9-26), as it was during the transition period to achieve the
Maastricht criteria of public finances (Balassone and Franco, 2000). 
Given the extreme degree of austerity in particular in the euro area since 2010,
it is not surprising that public investment suffered dramatic cuts (Figure 51 and
Figure 52). Gross public investment in the euro area as a whole fell from about
3% of GDP before the crisis to levels substantially below. In the periphery the
fall was even more dramatic from about 4% of GDP to just about 2% of (a
much lower) GDP since 2012. Net public investment, i.e. gross investment
minus depreciation developed even worse: in recent years almost all euro area
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member states have recorded negative public net investment, i.e. the public
capital stock has been decreasing.   
Figure 51. General government gross fixed capital formation in selected countries
ESA 2010, % of GDP
Source: European Commission (2016); authors’ calculations. 
Figure 52. General government net fixed capital formation (ESA 2010) in selected 
countries
    ESA 2010, % of GDP
Source: European Commission (2016); authors’ calculations.
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Although the cuts in public investment were particularly strong it should be
noted, that no category of public spending was left unaffected (Barbiero and
Darvas 2014). This is also true for public spending on education which suffered
dramatic cuts in the periphery (Truger 2016a). As Darvas et al. (2014) show,
not only the economic but also the social costs of austerity in the sense of an
increase in poverty and social hardship were extremely large. Aiginger (2014)
points to the fact that essential goals of “Europe 2020” have by now become
close to unattainable. At the same time the original goal of austerity—
decreasing the debt-to-GDP levels—has been missed because of the ongoing
economic crisis. 
b) Beyond the current fiscal rules, paths to reform
One frequently made proposal in the debate about European fiscal policy is to
apply stricter fiscal rules, or to allow for less flexibility in the application of the
current rules so as to make them really binding. The hope is that if fiscal targets
are reliably met this will restore confidence in the markets. Particularly conserv-
ative politicians and economists in Germany are in favour of this approach:
Recently the German council of economic experts (GCEE) recommended: “The
European fiscal rules should finally be enforced” (GCEE 2016: 16). In this
context it is hard to overstate the political significance of Germany’s supposedly
successful debt brake model. The German debt brake provided the blueprint for
the European Fiscal Compact’s stricter fiscal rules and its ambition that limits on
the public deficit should be enshrined in countries’ constitutions (BMF 2012, p.
44). The rapid consolidation of the German federal budget coincided with the
transition period before the debt brake fully came into effect, apparently
causing some observers to think that there was a causal relationship between
the two phenomena. According to the German Federal Ministry of Finance
(BMF 2015, p. 10), the fact that actual borrowing in the past few years and
projected borrowing for this year and for the entire financial planning period
are below the maximum permissible new borrowing limit is a sign that the debt
brake is working and is indeed “putting the brakes on” new borrowing.
However, a careful analysis reveals that praising the German debt brake as a
role model is not backed by the facts (Paetz, Rietzler and Truger 2016). The
apparent successes of the debt brake—the over-fulfilment of fiscal targets, rapid
consolidation and emulation by other EU governments under the fiscal
compact—are in fact a mirage. The consolidation outcomes, in particular the
fact that Germany has posted fiscal surpluses for the past two years, result from
the favourable economic and labour market development in Germany, espe-
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cially the unexpectedly rapid bounce-back from the Great Recession. On top of
this came substantial savings in interest payments due to the fall in interest
rates, as much of the remaining euro area was mired in recession and the ECB
pulled out the monetary stops.
The second, more fundamental point is that the favourable business cycle since
the introduction of the debt brake has so far concealed its most insidious
danger. On paper the debt brake is expressed in so-called “structural” or “cycli-
cally adjusted” terms. In any one year the government may not borrow more
than 0.35% of GDP—the same idea can be expressed in different equivalent
ways—on average across the cycle, assuming that the output gap is zero, or
after allowing for the current state of the business cycle. This is sensible, in prin-
ciple, for two reasons. Firstly because governments cannot control the current
(i.e. non-adjusted) deficit in the short run, and secondly because focusing on
the current balance would make fiscal policy pro-cyclical. It would constrain
government to tighten fiscal policy when the economy is weakening (and the
cyclical deficit rising) and permit a destabilising loosening of policy when the
economy is in a boom. The problem is that, for technical reasons, the govern-
ment budget out-turn relevant for the debt brake does in fact contain a
substantial cyclical element. This means that when the economy is weak the
reported, supposedly structural but actually partly cyclical, deficit is too high,
forcing the government into procylical tightening. Growth is depressed further,
risking a downward spiral.
To show just how grave this risk is Paetz, Rietzler and Truger (2016: 11-15)
conducted a counterfactual simulation using conservative estimations for the
key parameters. The simulation is also conservative in focusing only on central
government, leaving out federal-state finances. Real growth and inflation are,
initially, the same as actually occurred in the years 2012 to 2016. The only
change is that the unexpectedly quick and strong recovery 2010 and 2011, in
which the German economy grew by 4.1 and 3.7% respectively, is assumed not
to have occurred. Contemporary consensus GDP and inflation forecasts are
used instead (GDP: -0.5 and 1.4%).  Based on plausible assumptions for the
response (elasticity) of the budget to the lower nominal GDP, they then esti-
mate the (supposedly) “structural” budget balance that would have been
reported. The calculations indicate that by 2012 the budget out-turn would
have contravened the strictures of the debt brake, causing a tightening of
German fiscal policy beginning in 2013. Via the multiplier this in turn depresses
GDP compared to the actual values. By 2016 federal government spending
would be more than 12% below the unconstrained value and more than 7%
below the actual budget plan for the current year. And as a result the German
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economy would not only have missed out on the two-year boom: GDP would
have been depressed by a further 1.4pp. thanks to contractionary fiscal policy
forced by the application of the debt brake. Last but not least, this, in turn,
would mean that the debt/GDP ratio would have been more than 8pp higher.
Given the conservative parameterisation and the fact that federal state govern-
ments, many of whose finances are decidedly shakier and thus are more likely to
be forced into pro-cyclical tightening, the authors consider these estimates to
represent a lower limit for the economic losses. What is certain is that, absent a
short boom five years ago, Germany would be struggling to fulfill its debt brake
under conditions of a stagnating economy, quite similar to the situation that
many member countries find themselves in. And most probably the German
government would also feel the need to reform the current fiscal framework
and/or to increase flexibility in order to avoid further pro-cyclical tightening.
c) Adopting a smarter, economic, rule? The spending rule and 
the golden rule of public finance 
Obviously, there is a need for smarter rules that support public investment,
increase member states’ budgetary flexibility so as to improve counter-cycli-
cality, but at the same time ensure fiscal sustainability and compatibility with
the overall EU fiscal and economic policy framework.
Two potentially promising candidates in this respect are the Golden Rule for
public investment (see e.g. Truger 2015a) and some type of spending rule
approach, e.g. as recently proposed by Claeys, Darvas and Leandro (2016).14
The former aims at implementing the traditional public finance concept of the
golden rule within the framework of the SGP, i.e. deducting net public invest-
ment from both the headline and the structural deficit, so that net public
investment would be financed via deficits. The latter aims at giving up the
concept of the structural deficit within the SGP and instead using limits for
nominal expenditure growth that are determined by the medium term growth
rate of real potential output plus the ECB target inflation rate of 2%. Using
medium term potential growth rates and the target inflation rate stabilizes
expenditure growth over the cycle. Further stabilization is to be achieved by
focusing on that part of government expenditure that is actually under the
government’s control, i.e. spending on unemployment as well as interest
14. Similar spending rule approaches have been proposed much earlier in the debate on fiscal
consolidation in Europe (Horn and Scheremet 1999; Hein and Truger 2007).
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payments will be excluded from the spending rule. Public investment is to be
favoured by separating current and investment budgets just as in the golden
rule proposal. 
The two proposals might seem to be very different at first sight, but in fact they
are rather similar. If the same definition of public investment and depreciation,
the same orientation at medium term real potential growth plus inflation target
based on the same concept of cyclical adjustment of GDP is used and the way
they are embeded into the relevant fiscal framework is the same, they are
almost equivalent apart from some minor technical issues. 
However, in order to really ensure that both rules are really smarter some condi-
tions as to their implementation and as to some necessary changes in the fiscal
framework of the SGP have to be met. First, a suitable definition of public
investment will have to be agreed on. Second, the pro-cyclicality inherent in the
current fiscal framework will have to be effectively avoided. Third, fiscal sustain-
ability and compatibility with the overall fiscal and economic policy framework
will have to be established. 
Regarding public investment, privileging simply makes sense from an economic
point of view. The Golden rule has been a widely accepted traditional public
finance concept for the handling of government deficits for decades. It has
many advocates in academia starting with Richard A. Musgrave (1939 and
1959), one of the founding fathers of modern public finance. In the context of
the fiscal policy debate in the EU many economists have criticized the EU fiscal
framework of the SGP for its lack of a golden rule of public investment and
correspondingly proposed to introduce such a rule into the framework (e.g.
Fitoussi and Creel 2002: 63-65; Blanchard and Giavazzi 2004; Barbiero and
Darvas 2014; Dervis and Saraceno 2014). And, last but not least the German
Council of Economic Experts had delivered a proposal that was intended to
become more or less the blueprint for the German debt brake, which explicitly
expressed the need to include the golden rule as important element of the fiscal
rule (GCEE 2007); unfortunately that key part of the proposal was dropped.
It strives for an intertemporal realization of the pay-as-you-use principle in the
case that present government spending provides future benefits. It allows
financing such spending (=net public investment) by government deficits thus
promoting intergenerational equity. Net public investment increases the public
and/or social capital stock and provides benefits for future generations. There-
fore, it is justified that future generations contribute to financing those
investments via the debt service. Future generations inherit the burden of
public debt, but in exchange they receive a corresponding public and/or social
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capital stock. Failure to allow for debt financing of future generations’ benefits
will lead to a disproportionate burden for the present generation through
higher taxes or lower spending creating incentives for the under-provision of
public investment to the detriment of future generations. This general incentive
problem may become exacerbated in times of fiscal consolidation when cutting
public investment may seem the politically easiest way of reducing the budget
deficit. The recent experience with austerity policies shows that this danger is
real and has, in fact, materialized.15
The central question on a macroeconomic level is, whether general categories
of public spending can be identified that are usually associated with sufficiently
higher growth and productivity. Ideally, if the returns are high enough debt
sustainability would automatically be satisfied as the additional growth would
decrease or at least stabilize the debt to GDP ratio (IMF 2014: 110). The natural
starting point for the analysis is the debate about the growth effects of public
investment, as classified in the national accounts, as it has received the most
attention in the literature. It is note-worthy that the ESA 2010 national accounts
contain traditional infrastructure investment and also expenditure related to
research and development.
The central question of the long-run growth effects of public investment has
received much attention in the literature (for an overview see Romp and de
Haan 2005; Melo et al. 2013; Bom and Ligthart 2014). From a theoretical point
of view it is most plausible that public investment, especially if it focusses on
“core” infrastructure like transport facilities (roads, railways, ports, airports),
communication systems as well as power generation and other utilities should
be productive and growth enhancing. The public infrastructure stock in this
sense is simply indispensable for most productive processes: Without water and
energy supply, without transport capacities most production processes would
simply be unthinkable. It is, therefore, plausible to think of public infrastructure
as an input factor that is complementary to private capital and labour, inducing
additional supply.
However, at least two qualifications should be made. First, for additional public
infrastructure to be productive it should not be abundant. Although the quan-
tity and quality of infrastructure is difficult to measure, on the basis of the World
Economic Forum’s Competitiveness report the IMF (2014: 79-81) concludes
15. Using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model, Creel, Hubert and Saraceno (2013)
show that adopting the Golden rule would have limited the real costs of fiscal contraction in
European countries, in comparison with the public deficit limit and the Fiscal compact.  
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that from 2006 to 2012 the overall quality of infrastructure and that of roads
has clearly (slightly) decreased in Germany (France) and that it is lagging
behind in Italy. This is at least a hint that there is room for improvement. It is
also a hint that net public investment must not necessarily be into completely
new infrastructure projects, but that maintenance investment may also have an
important role to play. Second, although positive growth effects from core
infrastructure investment are most plausible from a theoretical point of view,
not all of public investment as defined in the national accounts is core infra-
structure. In fact, a substantial part of public investment is investment into
equipment as well as public buildings, e.g. for administration, education and
hospitals. For such investment a direct positive contribution to private produc-
tion processes may be more difficult to establish. However, for those countries
for which data on both the public capital stock as a whole as well as specifically
on public infrastructure is available, the correlation between the two is strong,
so that overall public investment may serve as a proxy for infrastructure invest-
ment (IMF 2014: 80).
Bom and Ligthart (2014) conducted meta-regressions including 68 studies with
578 estimates for the public capital-growth nexus and confirm this basic
conclusion for the period 1983 to 2008. According to their results, the average
output elasticity of public capital is 0.082. Conditional elasticities vary
depending on whether they refer to the short or the long run, to all public
capital or core infrastructure and to regional or national investment. They are
higher for core infrastructure, for regional investment and for the long run.
Table 11 shows the implied marginal returns which are in the range between
10 per cent (short run, national, all public capital) to 34.6 per cent (long run,
regional, core infrastructure). Whereas the latter marginal return is clearly large
enough to justify deficit-financed public investment even under pessimistic
assumptions about the user cost of capital (real interest rate plus depreciation
rate), the former would have to rely on more favourable conditions. However,
the implied long term marginal returns even in the case of all public capital for
Table 11. Implied marginal returns to public investment
In per cent
all public capital core public capital
Regional National regional national
Short term 17.4 10.2 24.0 16.8
Long term 28.0 20.8 34.6 27.4
Source: IMF (2014: 86); Bom and Ligthart (2014: 907-908); authors’ calculations.
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national and regional investment with 20.8 and 28 per cent are very high. All in
all, therefore, one may safely assume traditional public investment to have
considerably positive growth effects.
In addition to the longer-run supply-side effects the short-run demand-side
effects of public investment must also be addressed. As to the question of the
relative size of the public investment multiplier, the pre-crisis literature as a rule
of thumb found it to be (slightly) above one and therefore slightly larger than
for other spending categories so that public investment in addition to its long
term economic advantages could be seen as the most effective short-run fiscal
policy instrument16. Some of the recent studies even come up with much larger
(relative) estimates of the investment multiplier. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) obtain values larger than two with a maximum estimate of larger than
four whereas the estimates for government consumption spending are “only”
at about 1.4. Gechert (2015); Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) conducted
meta-regressions including 104, respectively 98 empirical multiplier studies
controlling for different study characteristics. They also generally find higher
investment multipliers as compared to their consumption counterparts (around
1.6 vs. 1), but the difference is certainly not as large as in the Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) paper. All in all, therefore, the empirical literature on
short-run effects of fiscal policy strongly supports protecting public investment
from consolidation pressures and using it to stimulate the economy. 
Should other potentially growth enhancing types of government spending be
classified as investment? In principle they should as long as it can be shown that
the growth effect to be expected is similar to that of traditional public invest-
ment. The natural candidate for this would be public spending on education,
which is close to research and development already included in national
accounts. Education as investment in human capital is crucial within endoge-
nous growth theory (Lucas 1988) and empirical research suggests that the
private as well as social rate of return of education can be assumed to be very
high (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004; Card 2001). Although it is difficult to
reliably compare the estimated rate of return for different types of expenditure,
it would at least be plausible to include public education expenditures under
the golden rule. This is also the general conclusion drawn by most advocates of
the golden rule. 
16. In an empirical evaluation of the Golden rule of public finance implemented in the UK, Creel,
Monperrus-Veroni and Saraceno (2009) found a multiplier effect of public investment close to 1
in the short run and close to 3 in the long run.
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However, at the present stage it is difficult to implement this in a convincing
way. First, an exact definition of the relevant education expenditure would have
to be given, which is not straightforward. Second, in order to be consistent with
the golden rule, net education investment would have to be measured, i.e.
depreciation would have to be deducted. Thus there are some difficult concep-
tual issues that would have to be resolved before education expenditure could
be properly included into the golden rule.
There are other expenditure categories that might be considered as investment
under a golden rule. Indeed, from a supply-side perspective some types of
social spending may well be highly productive, because they increase labour
supply and production: Health expenditures, if effective, will contribute to a
more stable and larger workforce. Spending on child care can substantially
increase parents’ labour force participation (Bauernschuster and Schlotter
2015). And the same may be said for spending on social work and integration.
All of this could lead to higher labour force participation and therefore
contribute to higher growth and, at the same time, to one of the main Europe
2020 goals. Obviously, it is not easy to find adequate definitions and estimating
depreciation in order to arrive at net investment may be even more difficult.
The fact that at the current stage there are difficulties, however, does not mean
that an economically rational and workable definition of potentially relevant
other investment expenditures does not exist, at all. It only means, that for the
first stage of privileging public investment one needs a pragmatic political deci-
sion based on empirical results about the expected growth benefits. Relying on
the traditional definition of public investment from the national accounts may
not be the worst option in that regard.
Decreasing the pro-cyclicality that is inherent in the current EU fiscal policy
framework is extremely important. The cyclical adjustment of public finances
plays a major role in the European Commission’s concept of budgetary surveil-
lance within the framework of the SGP (Larch and Turrini 2010). With the
exception of the excessive deficit threshold, all target values for the government
budget balance are expressed in terms of structural, i.e. cyclically adjusted,
values, and the cyclical condition of the economy plays a major role in assessing
the necessary consolidation effort and potential exceptions. The most important
concept in this respect is the structural budget balance, i.e. the cyclically
adjusted government budget balance corrected for one-off measures in terms of
which the consolidation requirements under the SGP and the FC are expressed. 
The main problem is that the method is far from being unequivocal, and
compared to OECD and IMF estimates the one employed by the EU Commis-
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sion has proven to be especially sensitive to an endogeneity bias, i.e. the
problem that potential output is highly sensitive to variations in actual output
(see e.g. Klär 2013; Truger and Will 2013; Heimberger 2014). During economic
contractions – especially during large and durable contractions such as those
observed in the Euro crisis – the estimates of potential output are revised
substantially downwards. For an illustration assume that the spring 2010 fore-
cast for potential GDP had not been revised since then. Then in 2015, for
almost all countries, with the exception of Germany, the output gap would
have been substantially higher had it not been for the crisis induced downward
revision of potential GDP since spring 2010. For the EMU-12 as a whole the
output gap would be estimated to be -6.7% of GDP instead of the official esti-
mate of just -1.7%. The iAGS output gap estimate is -3% of GDP whereas
Jaroczynski and Lenza estimate it to be -6%. The dramatic downward revisions
of potential GDP in the official Commission calculations have substantial conse-
quences for the calculation of structural budget balances and the assessment of
consolidation efforts. These efforts will usually be underestimated because a
substantial part of the fiscal effort is wiped out, as a larger part of the actual
deficit is registered as structural although in fact it may well just be cyclical, i.e.
caused by a temporary contraction.  
Therefore, using less cyclically sensitive methods of estimating potential output
and drawing on the medium-term potential growth rate as proposed by Claeys,
Darvas and Leandro (2016) would mean substantial progress. Additionally,
using a spending rule avoids problems with the estimation of the budgetary
semi-elasticity that is used to calculate the cyclical part of the budget deficit.
However, for the spending rule to really avoid pro-cyclicality, unlike in the
proposal by Claeys, Darvas and Leandro (2016), the spending rule would have
to be amended in the preventive arm of the SGP, but also be the major point of
reference in the corrective arm: If instead the public deficit limit at 3% of GDP
remained to be the central indicator, there could be an inconsistency between
the deficit limit and the spending rule in the mid-run. As a matter of fact,
expenditure growth under the spending rule might produce a growing deficit.
In the short run, this would be compatible with the SGP’s corrective arm, but
not automatically in the mid run if recovery had not occurred yet and tax
receipts had not increased: expenditure composition and/or taxes (or tax bases)
would have to be modified to match the deficit limit and the medium-term
objective (of close to balanced budget). The spending rule would not rule out
fiscal contraction in bad times.
The leeway for more expansionary fiscal policies under both the golden rule and
the expenditure rule proposed by Claeys et al. (2016) could be substantial. Both
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would basically allow debt financing of net public investment which could give
a large stimulus depending on the level chosen by the member countries. If
only the pre-crisis average level was reached, the stimulus would be about 0.7
percent of GDP, but much more would be possible. The leeway for non-invest-
ment spending would depend critically on the estimate of medium term
potential growth. In the calculations by Claeys, Darvas and Leandro (2016) the
limit for expenditure growth is currently not much above actual expenditure
growth, resulting from the fact that potential growth estimates have been
revised downwards substantially. However, in the past years the effect would
have been very substantial, in particular for the crisis countries. In Spain for
example the feasible expenditure growth rate exceeded the actual rate by
9 percentage points in 2012 (Claeys, Darvas and Leandro 2016: 13). 
As for public finance sustainability, both rules could lead to higher deficit-to-
GDP levels depending on the definition of net investment and depending on
the leeway they create for higher deficits. This may cause a problem for sustain-
ability in the sense that it may collide with the 60% threshold for the debt-to-
GDP ratio. However, if public investment is defined such that it is really growth-
enhancing both in the short and in the long-run then the conflict may disap-
pear. Moreover, the spending rule proposed by Claeys et al. includes a closure
rule decreasing the permissible expenditure growth rate by 0.02 percentage
point for every 1% deviation from the 60% limit. A similar effect could be
achieved in the current framework by adjusting the MTO if after some time the
debt-to-GDP level increases strongly. However, such a debt-feedback mecha-
nism reduces spending leeway for those countries facing higher debt levels,
which are also those that may require the greatest fiscal leeway. In contrast, the
golden rule is not a priori complemented with a debt-feedback rule. Even so the
golden rule is compatible with debt stabilization.17 Both rules could be comple-
mented with an additional closure rule taking into account the current account
position such that countries with current account surpluses gain fiscal leeway
while countries with deficits lose it.
17. Under the golden rule of public investment, the cyclically-adjusted deficit target would be
exempted from expenditures on net investment. It would not be exempted from interest
payments. Hence, a higher net investment financed with public debt leads to higher interest
payments (all else equal) which weigh on the deficit target. To match the target, interest
payments face a ceiling due to the existence of a floor on non-cyclical non interest payments
expenditures. The ceiling on interest payments is, at constant interest rates, a ceiling on debt to
GDP ratio. Consequently, the golden rule does not prevent effective debt management and
therefore incentivizes the implementation of the most-productive investments as they will
facilitate debt stabilization and sustainability via economic growth. See Creel (2003) for details.
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d) Using the room for maneuver under the current rules for more 
flexibility and higher public investment
One essential question is whether the introduction of the golden rule of public
investment—at best combined with a better expenditure rule—would be
compatible with current EU law or whether a change of Council regulations or
even the Treaty would be necessary. The golden rule would permanently
change the interpretation of the relevant deficit definitions in a way that is not
completely in line with the Treaty. And the expenditure rule, which is already
part of the preventive arm of the SGP (although it needs a reformulation, as the
actual one is not very well specified), has to become the major reference point
in the excessive deficit procedure. Therefore, most probably, legal changes
would be necessary in both cases. This would be an impediment for immediate
implementation, however, the necessary changes could be adopted as primary
law in the form of an ‘Investment Protocol’ that would be annexed to the Treaty
under the simplified revisions procedure of Art.48 of the Lisbon treaty (see
table 4) On the member states’ level further legal changes would be required if
following the fiscal compact there were other legal provisions put in place that
would prevent a reinterpretation of the budget balance as net of net spending
on public investment. Of course, these changes on the national level would be
ambitious, but they would probably be supported by the fact, that the reason
for the legal requirements, the regulations on the EU level, would no longer
exist. Before discarding the options as politically unrealistic it should also be
noted that the official plans stated in the five presidents’ report will require
substantial legal changes as well, so that obviously some political will for
change may be presupposed. 
Nevertheless, it would probably take some time until the necessary political and
legal steps could be completed. They should therefore mainly be seen as a fiscal
policy framework focused on safeguarding public investment and flexibility in
the medium term, and not so much as a readily available instrument for
providing the—urgently needed—boost to the European economy in the short
run. Therefore the question arises whether there is a way to complement the
more medium term changes by some form of short-term fiscal stimulus and
flexibility within the current institutional framework. It is indeed possible to use
the leeway inherent in the current institutional framework for such a stimulus
provided the European Commission and the European Council were willing to
more actively use the interpretational leeway within this framework (see Table
12 for an overview of measures). Actually, the clarification as to the interpreta-
tion of the Pact that the Commission has given in 2015 as well as the final
position on the Commonly agreed position on Flexibility in the Stability and
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Growth Pact by the council can already be seen as illustrating important if still
timid steps in that direction. 
At least additional net investment could be justified if it came in the form of a
temporary investment programme, analogous to the way the Commission inter-
prets contributions to the EFSI (1). Additionally or alternatively, it may be
possible to treat an investment programme as a structural reform that tempo-
rarily allows for deviations from MTO or the adjustment path towards it (2).
Admittedly, the conditionalities and limits set by the Commission and the
Council in their current interpretation (co-financing of EU projects, limit of 0.5%
of GDP, mostly for countries in the preventive arm) certainly prevent a substan-
tial and sustained fiscal stimulus, but at least the provisions may be used for some
stimulus and political pressure may be built up to push for a more generous
interpretation in application or for a more generous official reinterpretation. 
Reference to adverse cyclical conditions might help to increase leeway even
further (4), although this could create the danger of a stop-and-go investment
policy, if cyclical conditions improve as can be expected under an investment
Table 12. Various opportunities to strengthen public investment and facilitate an 
expansionary overall fiscal policy stance in Europe
Goals Measures
Short term (use interpretational leeway within present framework to increase budgetary 
flexibility and boost public investment)
Strengthening 
investment
+
Expansionary overall
fiscal policy stance
(1) Allow for temporary investment programmes (analogous to EFSI)
(2) Interpret temporary investment programmes as structural reforms
(3) Incorporate realistic investment multiplier in budgetary analysis ex 
ante
(4) Increase flexibility for cyclical conditions
(5)  Use exception for severe downturn 
(6) Implement better methods of cyclical adjustment
Medium term (solid implementation of changes regarding public investment)
EU implementation
(7) ‘Investment protocol’ as annex to the Treaty
(simplified revisions procedure Art.48)
National implementation
(8) Change national legislation to allow necessary changes based on 
the golden rule of public investment combined with a better 
spending rule 
Source: authors’ compilation based on Truger (2015a).
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programme. Probably the most convincing way to increase member states’ fiscal
space in the short run would be to use the provision concerning a severe down-
turn in the euro area or the EU to justify a temporary deviation from the
consolidation path, thus allowing for a substantial European Investment
Programme. The Commission has explicitly made a comparison with the 2008
European Economic Recovery Plan (European Commission 2008) to give an
example of the potential use of this provision (European Commission 2015b:
17). As a condition for the use of this provision it “should remain limited to
exceptional, carefully circumscribed situations to minimise the risk of moral
hazard.” (European Commission 2015b: 17). Actually, one may well argue that
the euro area is right now in such an exceptional situation after years of recession
and stagnation and low inflation while monetary policy is at the lower bound. 
All of this could further be supported if realistically high multiplier values were
used in assessing the budgetary impact of additional investment which may not
be significantly negative or even positive (3). Reconsideration of the EU
Commission’s method of cyclical adjustment (6) – e.g. to be more in line with
the OECD method and results – may create further leeway as it might increase
the cyclical part of the budget deficit thus reducing the structural deficit (Truger
2015b). In fact, as has been mentioned above, one may well argue that the
negative output gap calculated by the European Commission underestimates
the bad cyclical condition of the euro area economy by at least 1.3 percentage
points (iAGS) to 4.3 percentage points (Jarocinski and Lenza 2016) in 2015.
Applying the standard budgetary semi-elasticity this would first of all substan-
tially change the structural balance calculations by about 0.7 to 2.2 percentage
points creating substantial leeway for the countries under the preventive arm of
the SGP. As fiscal effort calculations would also be affected positively this would
also help the countries under the excessive deficit procedure. Finally, the
dramatically more negative cyclical condition would both create more leeway
to use the exceptional clause under the EDP.
Using some of these measures, it should be possible to implement a fiscal stim-
ulus programme for public investment in the definition deemed necessary in
the dimension of 1-2% of GDP for several years. What could the macroeco-
nomic consequences of such a programme be? Would it be able to spark of a
self-sustaining recovery in the euro area if implemented soon? 
In order to address these questions we present the results of some simple multi-
plier-based simulations (Truger 2016b). The simulations are not meant to be
completely realistic or comprehensive as they are not based on a sophisticated
macroeconomic model of the euro area. Instead they present some cautious,
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plausible, multiplier-based estimates of what the macroeconomic consequences
of a public investment stimulus could be if it were introduced for five years from
2016 to 2020 in order to allow deficit financing of net public investment by
1.5% of GDP. The simulations focus on real GDP, real GDP-growth, the govern-
ment deficit and the government debt-to-GDP-ratio. 
In the first step the feasible government investment stimulus compared to the
baseline scenario (projected development based on (extrapolations of) the
national stability programmes from 2015 to 2020) is determined. In the second
step this stimulus is multiplied with the government investment multiplier. This
in turn is determined by a 30% addition to the standard fiscal (expenditure)
multiplier. In line with a simple income-expenditure model with a proportional
income tax (t) and income dependent imports with the marginal propensity to
import (m) and the standard marginal propensity to consume (c) as well as the
meta study by Gechert (2015) the standard multiplier for the euro area as a
whole is set at 1.45 and the investment multiplier at 1.9 which seems plausible
given the recent empirical multiplier estimates referred to in the previous
section. 
Figure 53. Selected macroeconomic indicators for baseline and investment stimulus 
scenarios for the euro area-12
Source: Authors’s calculations based on Truger (2016b).
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The first-round effect of the fiscal impulses was then calculated by multiplying
the fiscal impulse by the relevant multiplier leading to a corresponding increase
in real GDP. This in turn leads to an improvement in the general government
budget balance according to the country-specific budgetary semi-elasticities
(Mourre et al. 2014). Depending on the specific multiplier value, public invest-
ment spending is self-financing to considerable degree. Whether the self-
financing effects open up additional fiscal leeway depends on whether they are
interpreted as cyclical or as structural. According to the pro-cyclical method of
cyclical adjustment by the European Commission (Truger 2015b and 2015c) a
substantial part of the improvement would be interpreted as structural, so that
it could be used for further fiscal stimulus.18 This in turn starts an additional
expansionary process. In order to simulate the revisions of the potential growth
estimates the resulting time-series for the real GDP values from 1991 onwards
were filtered with the modified Hodrick-Prescott-Filter (mHP-Filter) used by the
Swiss administration for the Swiss debt brake (see Bruchez 2003).
This leads to second-round expansionary effects, which lead to an increase in
GDP according to the standard fiscal multiplier, which in turn influences the
(structural) budget balance. In order to add a degree of realism a small infla-
tionary reaction was added by increasing the price level by 0.3 percentage
points for every 1 percentage point increase in real GDP. 
For the calculation of the fiscal impulses in the ex-ante-simulations government
net fixed investment as implied by countries’ (extrapolation of) stability
programmes was used. Under the assumption that all governments would
increase net investment in a stepwise manner19 until the 1.5 percent of GDP-
limit was reached, investment stimuli according to the left-hand column of
Figure 11 would be realised. In the case governments in the baseline scenario
already had positive net investment under the golden rule this increases their
leeway for other expenditures.
The resulting multiplier-based increase in GDP and—according to the mHP-
Filter-simulations—also in potential GDP would then lead to a structural
improvement of the budget balance which in turn could be used for further
18. If leeway for the investment stimulus was created by using a new method of cyclical adjustment
that lead to a larger negative output gap this second round effect would be precluded or
potentially smaller. However, in this case the room for manœuvre would be larger right from the
start so that the overall results should be comparable.
19. The stepwise approach is taken so as to not cause a sudden explosion of investment demand
which may lead to an increase in the public investment deflator.
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fiscal expansion. The induced additional fiscal leeway is substantial and as large
as the initial investment stimulus. All in all the macroeconomic effects are quite
impressive. If the golden rule were operating from 2016 onwards, fiscal policy
could be expansionary by a cumulated 3.0 percent of GDP in the euro area as a
whole until 2020 which would improve macroeconomic performance substan-
tially (see Figure 53). Real annual GDP growth could on average be
1 percentage point higher with only a minor increase in the budget deficit due
to a high degree of self-financing. The debt-to-GDP ratio could even be lower
by 5 percentage points. The simulation only captures the short-term demand
effects, however, if—as can be expected from the empirical literature on the
long term growth effects—productivity capacity is affected positively by the
investment stimulus, the positive effects may well be persistent.
Even if highly stylised, these analyses suggest that there would be very substan-
tial economic and employment benefits from using the leeway within the
existing framework in order to boost public investment.
3.3. Conclusion
We have seen that ECB policies, both standard and non-standard, have had a
real impact on investment. Reforming the economic governance architecture
therefore means fiscal reforms and flexibility in the implementation of fiscal
rules. Regarding reforms, we advocate cautiousness in the assessment of the
German debt brake. The success of the German rule has been very dependent
on exceptional circumstances, namely unexpected growth. Consequently, we
do not advocate the endorsement of this kind of rule. Rather, we promote reli-
ance on a reformed spending rule combined with the golden rule of public
investment which would give domestic fiscal leeway for increasing public
investment without impairing debt sustainability. A domestic push to public
investment would accelerate recovery and would boost potential output. With
the golden rule effective from 2016 onwards, fiscal policy could be expan-
sionary and raise annual real GDP growth by 1 percentage point on average till
2020. Due to large self-financing effects, the budget deficit would hardly
increase and the debt-to-GDP ratio could even be lower by 5 percentage
points. Furthermore the positive effects may well be persistent, as the long term
growth rate is also affected positively by the investment stimulus. 
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APPENDIX 1. Investment equation for the euro area
Monetary policy influences the investment rate through the cost of funding. The
estimated equation makes a distinction between the impact of monetary policy in
the long-run and in the short run. Monetary policy is measured by the shadow rate,
which is the implicit interest rate set by the ECB and taking into account the uncon-
ventional monetary measures. For sake of simplicity, the total cost of capital only
takes into account the interest rate set by banks on loans to non-financial corpora-
tions. Hereafter, we do not account for a potential effect of monetary policy on
banks’ spread, which may also be another channel through which monetary policy
has influenced credit conditions and final demand. Consequently, the measured
impact of monetary policy on investment that we compute may be considered as a
lower bound.
The estimated equation (an error-correction model) for total investment in the euro
area is represented by the following equation:
With I the investment, VA the value-added, Marge the margin rate, Shadow the
indicator of monetary policy calculated by Wu and Xia (2016) and that takes into
account the unconventional monetary policy measures. The bank spread is the gap
between the interest rate on loans for non-financial corporations and the EONIA
rate. CUR stands for the rate of capacity utilization. In the long term, an increase in
margins has a significant positive impact on the investment rate. The cost of
funding (measured by the indicator of monetary policy and the bank spread) affects
negatively and significantly the investment rate. The model is estimated by OLS for
the euro area. The sample period for estimation is 1999Q1 / 2015Q4. Data are
taken from Eurostat, ECB and Datastream.
− 0.035
−0.151 + 2.09
 
−0.214ΔI + 0.138ΔI + 1.108ΔVA  
−0.006ΔCUR + 0.03 +0.006  
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APPENDIX 2. Identification of financial bubbles
Following Blot, Hubert and Labondance (2016), bubbles are identified on three
different financial markets: stock, bond and housing, by focusing on the common
component from different bubble models, using euro area data from January 1999
to September 2015. These models are the following:
1. Cash-flow model adjusted for risk-premium (estimated with OLS and ECM).
2. Full-information price model (estimated with OLS and ECM) yielding the best
prediction of the fundamental value from a set of macro and financial
variables.
3. HP-filter model, where the fundamental is the trend and the bubble is the
cycle.
4. Statistical approach, where the boom (resp. bust) period is defined as a devi-
ation from the trend above (resp. below) 1.3 standard-deviation (Bordo and
Jeanne, 2002).
For each of the first 3 models, two types of bubble components are defined:
A. Standard residuals/cycle component.
B. Sum of the (Christiano-Fitzgerald) filtered residuals/cycle component, as long
as these residuals/cycle component have the same sign.
From these models 11 series of bubble for each asset price (stock, bond and
housing) in the euro area can be identified. Using Principal Component Analysis
(PCA), Blot et al. (2016) estimate the first component of the 11 series for each asset
class and consider it as a bubble indicator. With such an approach, the bubble indi-
cator maximizes the common variance among the 11 series, with no prior about
which bubble model is best, and drops idiosyncratic evolutions specific to each
bubble model. This procedure should be seen as model averaging with estimated
weight (the PCA eigenvalues).

